Interestingly, the group established itself on the northern coast among fishing communities. These communities had long suffered economic marginalization and poor governmental presence. The extremists exploited this neglect strategically, offering financial incentives, social support structures, and a sense of belonging to disaffected youth. Furthermore, many of these communities were predominantly Muslim, which made it easier for the group to use religious narratives to win sympathy. Young men, frustrated by unemployment and a lack of development, became easy targets for recruitment. Over time, these recruits played central roles in the brutal attacks that destabilized Cabo Delgado.

With the rise and subsequent spread of violent extremism in West Africa, littoral states have become particularly vigilant, especially in their northern border regions located in the Savannah and Sahel belts. These border areas have historically been vulnerable due to porous boundaries, difficult terrain, and limited security infrastructure. As extremist groups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger expand their operations, coastal states fear that insurgents could spill southwards. This has prompted increased surveillance, border security operations, and intelligence-sharing initiatives among the littoral states.

Admittedly, many states have implemented various counterterrorism measures within their territories. Governments have strengthened military capabilities, improved security cooperation, and introduced deradicalization campaigns. Some have also invested in poverty-reduction measures and local engagement programs aimed at addressing root causes of extremism. Nevertheless, these efforts have largely focused on northern interior regions. Coastal zones, despite being equally vulnerable, have not received the same level of strategic attention.

Coastal states, especially those on the west coast of West Africa, must pay extra attention to their shores. The maritime borders of these states are vast and often poorly monitored. Fishing communities, ports, estuaries, and mangrove zones offer numerous entry points for criminal networks and extremist infiltrators. Failure to protect these coastal areas could allow violent groups to establish bases, smuggling routes, or recruitment centers beyond the immediate reach of national security forces.

 Like in Mozambique and elsewhere, extremists have always taken advantage of local Muslim communities to create disaffection toward central authorities. Extremist ideologues typically prey on communities that feel politically excluded or socio-economically neglected. They use distorted religious teachings, mixed with messages about inequality, marginalisation, and poor governance, to undermine trust in the state. By presenting themselves as defenders of justice and providers of services, they manage to lure vulnerable youth into their ranks, often by exploiting genuine grievances.

Sierra Leone, Guinea, Senegal, The Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau all have majority-Muslim populations that have lived harmoniously with Christian minorities for decades. These countries are often cited as examples of religious tolerance and coexistence in Africa. Despite some of these sharing borders with conflict-affected states like Mali, they have so far avoided major jihadi attacks. The resilience of their social cohesion, strong community leadership, and historically moderate Islamic traditions have contributed significantly to this stability. However, security experts warn that the presence of peace today does not guarantee immunity tomorrow.

Experts warn of a near “inevitability” of violent extremism spreading to these coastal states as JNIM and ISIS intensify their territorial ambitions. The concern is not merely hypothetical. Jihadi networks have demonstrated a clear strategy of moving southwards from the Sahel, exploiting weak governance and socio-economic vulnerability. Some analysts predict that instead of attacking through heavily guarded northern borders, extremist groups may choose to infiltrate Muslim fishing communities along the coasts. Such an approach would allow them to blend with local populations and strike unexpectedly, catching security agencies off guard.

The depletion of fish resources and other environmental challenges have severely affected the socio-economic well-being of coastal communities. Overfishing foreign trawlers, climate-related changes in marine ecosystems, and rising sea temperatures have caused drastic declines in fish stocks. Fishermen now return with smaller catches, leading to reduced incomes and growing frustration. Pollution, including oil spills and waste dumping, worsens the situation, further threatening livelihoods and deepening poverty.

Recently, suspected chemical pollution on the Guinean coast has caused skin diseases among fishermen. These incidents have intensified anger at the authorities, whom communities accuse neglect environmental regulation and fail to provide medical support. Such grievances, if not addressed, can become openings for extremist propaganda. Groups often capitalize on local frustrations by offering aid, protection, or even compensation, tools that help them build loyalty and credibility.

These and other hardships have already created disaffection toward governments in the region, conditions extremist groups tend to exploit, especially where Muslim populations are involved. Economic hardship limited public services, and feelings of marginalization create fertile ground for indoctrination. Insurgent groups are known to combine religious manipulation with promises of economic benefits, thereby attracting individuals who feel abandoned by their states.

Mozambique provides a clear example of how fisherfolk can be radicalised. The case of Cabo Delgado demonstrates that when coastal communities are neglected, extremist groups can easily insert themselves into local grievances. Governments in West Africa must learn from this and ensure these communities do not become the next targets of radicalization.

Governments in the sub-region must therefore address socio-economic challenges in these communities while maintaining vigilance along their borders to prevent the “contiguous” spread of extremism. Comprehensive solutions are required; ones that combine security operations with livelihood improvement programs, environmental protection, maritime surveillance, and community engagement.

Education should be prioritized. A well-educated population is less vulnerable to extremist ideologies. Investing in both formal and religious education can strengthen critical thinking, promote tolerance, and reduce the influence of radical preachers. Education also expands economic opportunities, lowering the appeal of extremism among unemployed youth.